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knows nothing of effects. But even if we substitute the relation of ground and consequent for that of cause and effect, I do not see that it improves the argument. Have we any right to conclude from a finite consequent to an infinite ground? In the article *Fœticide*, the reference to the *Republic* of Plato should be V, 461, B. C. V, 640 refers not to fœticide but infanticide. In the article *Fortune* (Greek), I do not think Mr. St. George Stock is right in "saying for Plato" that chance must be excluded from the cosmos. Plato definitely retains the *πλανωμένη αἰτία* (Tim., 48, A), and in spite of what Mr. Archer Hind and others have said, I think that this involves chance and is connected with the recalcitrant element of matter in Nature. A feature of the very able article on Gnosticism by Prof. E. F. Scott is the emphasis laid on the recently discovered Coptic treatises. Though they represent a decadent type of gnosticism, they are of the highest importance, as the most extensive original sources. And there is every probability that fresh discoveries in Egypt will add to our knowledge of this phase of gnosticism. In the article *God* (Biblical and Christian), Prof. W. T. Davison takes a very conservative standpoint. An authoritative article on Hegel is contributed by Prof. J. B. Baillie. He might perhaps have said something about the remarkable Renaissance of Hegelianism which Germany is witnessing at present. In the article *Heraclitus*, it is interesting to note that in a famous fragment Diels returns to the reading *ἀνγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη* (R. P. 42). He takes it in close connection with the doctrine of Fire. The soul, the dry beam, is a spark of the divine Fire.

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THE BEAUTIFUL: AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL ÆSTHETICS. By Vernon Lee. Cambridge: The University Press, 1913. Pp. viii, 158.

I hope the day is not far distant when every new book on aesthetics will require to be reviewed in this JOURNAL. At present writers on that subject tend to lose themselves in the intricacies either of art-criticism or of psychological analysis, and until they emerge from these labyrinths and grasp the truth that aesthetics is a branch of ethics, all one can do is to select

from time to time some publication of outstanding merit for the purpose of pointing a moral. Vernon Lee is a gifted writer whose work on æsthetics is well known. Combining delicate sensibility and a knowledge of all forms of art with great philosophical curiosity, she is equipped with precisely those qualities, so rarely found together, without which any attack on the problem of beauty is foredoomed to failure. Just because her work is conspicuous always for acute observation, and not infrequently for just reasoning, this little book, which she has contributed to the series of Cambridge Manuals, is, in a way, more disappointing even than the stupidity of the ordinary run of æsthetic treatises.

Her analysis of æsthetic satisfaction is ingenious. What, she asks, are the peculiarities of our thinking and feeling in the presence of a thing which we call beautiful? We feel satisfactions and preferences; but so we do in the presence of things which we do not call beautiful. The problem is to discover what is common and peculiar to our æsthetic satisfactions. It is not enough to add that these satisfactions are 'of a contemplative kind,' that they have no practical aim, and that they involve emotional admiration; evidently more remains to be said, and so far no new ground has been broken. The first decisive step toward a definition of the beautiful is taken in the theory of Chapter III, that it is not things, but aspects of things, that are the peculiar objects of æsthetic contemplation. ('Aspects' are 'sensations grouped together into relations by our perception,' p. 34.) Still the definition is not complete. Æsthetic satisfaction is not constituted by any and every admiring contemplation of an aspect, but is specially connected with one particular aspect, namely, shape. Shapes are preëminently the objects of æsthetic contemplation. Not all shapes, of course; those which create a sense of difficulty are ugly. The contrary, however, is not true; ease of perception, though a necessary condition of beauty, is not enough by itself to make a shape beautiful. The presence of another factor is required, which may be described as empathic quality. We only have beauty, we only have the distinctively æsthetic satisfaction, when the perceptive activities of the subject are merged in the qualities of the object of perception; this process, which the author calls Empathy, is the essence of the sense of beauty. Though I fail to understand much of what is said in Chapter IX about Empathy, the main

points seem clear enough. They seem to be that, when we exclaim, for instance, at the beauty of a mountain rising against the sky, we are in some sense aware of certain activities taking place in ourselves (muscular tensions and movements), that these activities really are the 'rising' which we admire, and that our awareness of them 'coalesces with the shape we are looking at.' It seems to be held that no object is rightly called beautiful in respect of which this process does not take place, that no satisfaction is æsthetic which does not include it, that only those satisfactions that do include it are æsthetic, and that inspection of this process shows us why we prefer certain combinations of lines to others.

Thus to say that an object is beautiful means that the contemplation of one aspect of it, its shape, sets up a process by means of which the beholder's agreeable consciousness of his own mental activity in constructing shapes is projected into the object. This theory has one unusual merit: it recognizes the supreme importance of the formal element in art. In holding that the differentia of æsthetic appreciation is the emotional contemplation of shapes, I think that Vernon Lee has hit upon a momentous fact which is too often missed; the way in which she brings out the part played by shapes in art, in particular her discussion of visual art, where she puts imitative representation into its proper place as a subordinate factor in the production of beauty, deserves the warmest applause. Less admirable is the argument by which she reaches this conclusion. It starts from a distinction between sensation and perception. In bare passive sensation there can be no æsthetic satisfaction, because there is no activity; it is only where perception, with its activities of comparison and construction, begins, that satisfaction can begin to be æsthetic. And, since in the perception of shapes these activities are at their highest, and the passive sensational element at its lowest, it is in the perception of shapes that the distinctively æsthetic satisfaction consists. Without stopping to inquire why pleasure in activity should be supposed any more æsthetic than any other pleasure, we may observe that the nerve of this argument is the notion that the mind creates the relations perceived between sense-data. But, though the mind is in a sense more active in perception than in bare sensation,—in the sense, namely, that it grasps a complex of parts and relations, and that memory, thought, and attention

are involved,—this is no warrant for holding that the mind creates the relation between the parts of a percept any more than it creates what is given to it in bare sensation. If by ‘activity’ is meant creation of its objects, the activity of the mind in perceiving space-relations seems to be a fiction. Further, the mind is no more ‘active’ in perceiving space-relations than in perceiving non-spatial relations between colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and temperatures; the non-spatial complexes of these elements which we perceive seem to be just as much ‘constructions’ as do complexes of lines and spaces, and therefore, on the theory, just as capable of being primary objects of æsthetic satisfaction. That the pleasures of music, for instance, have to be derived from the pleasures of space-perception by way of the localization of sounds in an imaginary space, is a grave objection to the theory. Another set of objections arises from the reflection that, after all, the satisfaction evoked by beauty is not a satisfaction with our own activities. It seems impossible to deny that, in contemplating shapes, we may be unaware of our activities. Pages 55 and 56 illustrate the difficulties of hedging on this point,—a process which ends in the admission that it is *not* our activities but their *results* that we are aware of when we feel æsthetic satisfaction.

But, however right or wrong in details, the theory in question belongs to a class which, as a class, has one fatal flaw. In spite of the dictum *de gustibus*, it is a characteristic of æsthetic judgments that it is possible to dispute significantly about them. Now if any theory which, like Vernon Lee’s, makes the beauty of objects consist solely in the fact that some person or group of persons experiences some sort of emotion, were true, this would not be possible. If to say that a shape is beautiful merely means that it stimulates in all normal persons, provided they are in a receptive state of mind, certain empathic activities, then a dispute as to the beauty of a landscape or a picture must always resolve itself into a dispute as to whether somebody or other is empathically active or not. And it seems plain that this is not what we dispute about,—that when I say, ‘No, this picture you admire is not beautiful,’ what I intend to deny is not merely that your mind is in such and such a state. It seems, in other words, that all such theories are bound to neglect one important characteristic of æsthetic judgments, their objectivity. In vain will you try to smuggle in objectivity by a reference

to 'all normal persons'; even if all human beings at all times responded to beautiful objects in the way that you describe, to call an object beautiful would still mean something more than that.

In what, then, does the objectivity of æsthetic judgments consist? The question cannot be pursued here, but I may perhaps mention that feature of them which it appears most urgent to recognize as fundamental, if æsthetics is ever to be systematized as a branch of philosophy. Whenever an æsthetic proposition is true, a true ethical proposition seems to be implied; for whenever an object is beautiful, it seems true that the contemplation of it with the appropriate emotion would be one of those things of which the existence adds to the sum of intrinsic value in the universe. The investigation of the relation between these two kinds of propositions seems to me the most pressing of the tasks awaiting the student of æsthetics, and it would be fortunate if a writer of Vernon Lee's ability could be persuaded to undertake it.

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DIE THEORIE DES WAHREN INTERESSES UND IHRE RECHTLICHE UND POLITISCHE BEDEUTUNG. By Leonard Nelson. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913. Pp. 31.

This little pamphlet is one of the essays of the Friesian school, and is by an author whose other contributions on various philosophical subjects to the same series are well known. The problem described is the following: We ourselves and other people often have interests that conflict, and it is an ethical problem to decide on what principles the choice is to be made of which are to be fulfilled and which neglected. It is clear that the principle is not that the strongest must always be chosen; it is not our duty to allow people to steal our watches merely because their desire for them is stronger than our own. And even where neither of the conflicting interests is a criminal desire, it often happens that it is our duty to fulfil the weaker desire which is more valuable to the neglect of the stronger which is less so. Again there is the case of people whose desire is based on an erroneous belief about matters of fact. If we cannot alter this belief by argument, and if we judge that the fulfilment